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“The Power to Tax Involves the Power
to Destroy”
1

HOW AVANT-GARDE ART OUTSTRIPS THE
IMAGINATION OF REGULATORS, AND WHY A
JUDICIAL RUBRIC CAN SAVE IT
INTRODUCTION
Had they been there, Dan Flavin and Bill Viola might
have felt as naked as the fabled emperor when the customs
officials in London declared their artwork, carefully packed in
crates for international shipping, was just not art. Not art?
No⎯only light fixtures and DVD players. Dan Flavin, hailed as
the “conjurer of light and lyrical poet of Minimal Art,”2 and
considered part of the inner core of Minimalism, passed away in
1996 after decades of making neutral, geometric works with
fluorescent light tubes.3 Seminal video artist Bill Viola today
continues to make haunting, existential video works exploring a
central theme⎯birth and death.4 In 2006, United Kingdom
customs (Her Majesty’s Revenues & Customs or H.M. Revenues
& Customs) handed the London art gallery, Haunch of Venison,
a £36,000 bill5 when the gallery imported these two works from
the United States; Customs reasoned that the works, when
disassembled, fail to qualify for the discounted import tax
normally given to “works of art.”6 So disassembled, the works
amount to little more than electronic parts—light bulbs,
various lighting fixtures, projectors, and their accoutrement.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
Manfred Schneckenburger, Sculpture, in ART OF THE 20TH CENTURY, VOL.
II, at 528 (Germany, 1998).
3 The Collection: Dan Flavin, MOMA.ORG, http://www.moma.org/collection/
artist.php?artist_id=1911 (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
4 Christiane Fricke, New Media, in ART OF THE 20TH CENTURY, supra note 2,
at 615.
5 Georgina Adam, Flavin and Viola Light Works Ruled “Not Art,” ART
NEWSPAPER (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Flavin-and-Violalight-works-ruled-not-art/22069.
6 Pierre Valentin & Daniel McClean, Haunch of Venison VAT Victory, ART
NEWSPAPER (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Haunch-of-VenisonVAT-victory/16944.
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Under U.K. law, if classified as sculpture (a subcategory of the
general category of works of art), the works would only be
subject to an import value-added tax (VAT) of 5 percent and
would be completely exempt from customs duty.7 When U.K.
Customs declared that the parts of these artworks did not
qualify as artworks, or more specifically sculptures, the
importers were subjected to the standard import VAT rate8 (17.5
percent at the time,9 and 20 percent as of January 1, 201110).
In 2008, the gallery brought a lawsuit in the London
VAT and Customs Tribunal (Tribunal) challenging the customs
bill.11 At this proceeding, favorable U.K. and European Union
precedent, statements from U.S. tax officials, and testimony
from gallerists and critics convinced the court that the works
should be classified as sculptures, bringing them within the
VAT reduction and duty exemption.12 The Tribunal held that it
would be “absurd” to classify the components of the works as
something different from what they would be—works of art—
when they were fully assembled.13 But, in a 2010 reversal that
shocked the art world, the European Commission (Commission)
issued a regulation that reversed the 2008 decision of the
Tribunal and reaffirmed the original customs determination.14
According to the Commission, the light and video works of
Flavin and Viola were no more than the sum of their non-art

7 Dan Flavin and Bill Viola Not Art?, OTHER BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010, 6:53 PM),
http://blog.othercommunications.com/?p=788; Valentin & McClean, supra note 6.
8 Valentin & McClean, supra note 6.
9 Pierre Valentin, United Kingdom: The European Commission Says It’s Not
Art, MONDAQ (June 20, 2011), http://www.mondaq.com/x/135086/Music+and+the+Arts/
The+European+Commission+Says+Its+Not+Art [hereinafter Valentin, Not Art].
10 Europe Rules that Dan Flavin and Bill Viola Artworks Are Not Art, ARTINFO
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/36594/europe-rules-that-dan-flavinand-bill-viola-artworks-are-not-art/; see also Maev Kennedy, Call that Art? No, Dan
Flavin’s Work Is Just Simple Light Fittings, Say EU Experts, GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2010,
3:43 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2010/dec/20/art-dan-flavin-light-eu.
11 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008]
UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820 (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties Tribunal
(London)).
12 Valentin & McClean, supra note 6.
13 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820, at [49]; see also
Valentin & McClean, supra note 6.
14 Commission Regulation 731/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 214) (EC). See infra Part II; see
also Adam, supra note 5; Dan Flavin Work Classified by EU as Light Fittings, ARTLYST
(Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.artlyst.com/articles/dan-flavin-work-classified-by-eu-as-lightfittings; Europe Rules that Dan Flavin and Bill Viola Artworks Are Not Art, supra note
10; Kennedy, supra note 10; Murray Wardrop, VAT on Modern Art as EU Says Works are
“Light Fittings,” TELEGRAPH (Dec. 21, 2010, 8:47 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
culture/art/art-news/8216017/VAT-on-modern-art-as-EU-says-works-are-lightfittings.html.
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parts.15 Not only was this regulation⎯passed “behind closed
doors . . . . [and] contrary to the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice”⎯highly suspect, but it suggests that artists’
right to even call their work art is subject to the prevailing
opinions and mores of lawmakers.16 Additionally, the
regulation did not result from any appeal from the defendant,
H.M. Revenues & Customs. The Commission acted on its own,17
and contrary to court rulings in two separate European
Community member states that held that these and similar
works should be classified as art.18 Lawmakers with no vested
interest in the litigation passed this objectionable law. The
implications following from this regulation have riled the art
world. Far more radical contemporary artworks could face even
greater difficulty gaining widespread recognition as artworks.
Adding to the mystery, the Commission did not attempt to make
clear its overall policy or reasoning behind the regulation. This
note argues that legislating what does and does not qualify as
an “artwork” without any objective or specific rubric goes
against legal precedent and is dangerous to the livelihood of
artists.19 Implementing a universal standard for the assessment
of “art” as a formal classification would not be as difficult as it
might seem: U.S. copyright standards already possess the
necessary structure,20 and the European recognition of artists’
moral rights is mirrored in these standards.21
This note will begin in Part I with brief overviews of
Minimalist Art and Conceptual Art, paying particular attention
to the public reception of⎯and reactions to⎯shifting trends in
artworks over time and geography. Part II will give a brief
explanation of the legislative systems at work in the European
Kennedy, supra note 10.
Pierre Valentin, European Definition of Art Is Absurd: The Fact that the
European Commission Can, Without Any Public Consultation or Publicity, Overrule the
Decision of Two National Tribunals, Makes a Mockery of the Judicial Process, ART
NEWSPAPER (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/European-definitionof-art-is-absurd/22178 [hereinafter Valentin, European Definition].
17 Id.; Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9.
18 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9.
19 For an in-depth treatment of art and judicial subjectivity through the lens of
various aesthetic theories, see Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805
(2005). Farley suggests that judges and courts could rely more directly on these various
aesthetic theories in developing their art-judging jurisprudence. Id. at 808. Aesthetic
philosophies filter into opinions subconsciously, even sometimes reluctantly, according to
Farley. Id. at 845. Being more upfront about the use of these theories could clarify courts’
rulings, and the “rich discourse” could give courts more support. Id. at 809.
20 For a discussion of “recognized stature” under U.S. copyright law, see infra
notes 262-80 and accompanying text.
21 For a discussion of “droit morale” under the Berne Convention, see infra
notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
15
16
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Community (EC),22 as well as an introduction to the European
value-added tax system. Part III of this note will discuss various
instances of courts, both in the United States and abroad,
attempting to navigate the intersection of artwork and customs
duties and taxation. Part IV will explore various approaches to
protection for conceptual and visual artworks, giving special
attention to problems encountered by the more difficult cases.
That part will conclude with a suggested method for evaluation
and classification of artworks that can be applied by courts and
legislators, domestically and abroad, that leaves intact both the
artists’ intentions and their artworks’ integrity. This note will
conclude with a brief discussion of how similar VAT or flat-tax
systems implemented in the United States could lead to
comparable difficulties in U.S. courts and legislatures.
I.

THE ART BACKDROP

New art, and particularly conceptual art, has a history
of challenging the public with works that have not yet been
received as art. Legislators and customs officials are not
typically on the cutting edge of the art world, and they can be
as hostile as the general public to new works by avant-garde
artists. Flavin’s and Viola’s works, though hardly new
artforms, represent conceptual methods in art that fit into a
rich history of progressive upstarts challenging the established
norms of the art world.23 The criticisms of many late twentieth
and early twenty-first century works of art—the Damien Hirst
vitrines,24 the Allan Kaprow “happenings,”25 the Chris Burden
performance works26—are numerous, but discord between
newer artists, who experiment in form, material, and content,
and the canon of art history, is almost a tradition itself.
22 For purposes of this note, I will be using EC and EU interchangeably—EC
when referring to cases where the EC is specifically mentioned, and EU when referring
to the member states. The EC was absorbed into the EU when it was created, but
current case law and legislation still refers to the EC without caveat. European
Community—EC,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/europeancommunity.asp#axzz1rfwQHuWh (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
23 See WILLIAM FLEMING, ARTS & IDEAS 583 (9th ed. 1995) (describing twentieth
century modern artists as “command[ing] attention” by “intend[ing] to delight or irritate,
to arouse or denounce, to exhort or castigate, to surprise or excite, to sooth or shock”).
24 See Maev Kennedy, Art Market “a Cultural Obscenity,” GUARDIAN (June 3,
2004, 6:29 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/jun/03/arts.artsnews.
25 See Judith Rodenbeck, Madness and Method: Before Theatricality, 13 GREY
ROOM 54, 59 (2003), available at http://slc.academia.edu/JudithRodenbeck/Papers/
402348/Madness_and_Method_Before_Theatricality.
26 See Roger Ebert, The Agony of the Body Artist, ROGER EBERT’S J. (Oct. 14, 2009,
11:08 PM), http://blogs.suntimes.com/ebert/2009/10/the_agony_of_the_body_artist.html.
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Flux Is Constant in the Art World: A Brief History

Take the seventeenth century turn from the late
Renaissance’s “bold humanistic thinking” into the “bitter selfreproach” of the Counter-Reformation.27 This social movement
brought a return to a strong religious presence in art.28
Caravaggio and others imbued this baroque-period work with a
dark humanism that was not always well received.29 The
religious populace favored a “more conventional elegance and
illusionism . . . .”30 Even the nineteenth century romantic
Delacroix’s color-intensive, emotional, and macabre works were
once the subject of “storms of protest and abuse[,]” though they
now rest comfortably among other works of the movement.31
These “rebels” draw attention for the blatant and unapologetic
ways in which they push the edge of the previous movement
into the infancy of the next. Manet’s Realist paintings “drew all
manner of critical vituperation from the press and public.”32
Academics of the day “held [Raphael] to be the perfect painter”
even though all agreed the “ugliness” of realism should be put
aside for a more uplifting style of art.33 Rodin had trouble as
well, suffering accusations that his sculpture was “[t]oo
lifelike”—or worse—“[t]oo good.”34 Even when Impressionism
was first introduced it was “a term of critical derision.”35
Twentieth century modernists often intended for their
works to be overt challenges to the form of art de mode, and
“[j]udging from the reactions to Picasso’s early exhibits [and
Stieglitz’s famous Armory Show] . . . some artists succeeded
beyond their wildest expectations.”36 Artists of the early
twentieth century had to fight hard for acceptance, holding
“street demonstrations against museums and art galleries that
refused the modernists recognition.”37 The protests subsided
halfway through the century, and many of “[t]hese artists [are
now considered] old masters of modern art.”38

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

FLEMING, supra note 23, at 377.
Id.
Id. at 383-85.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 583, 630.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 583, 630.

1670

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:4

Even the most open modernist mind was challenged by
the cubists’ and futurists’ abstractions, but the Dadaists’ and
Surrealists’ reactions to World War I pushed it even further.39
The Dadaists and Surrealists both advocated abandoning the
prevailing styles of art.40 The constant state of flux of the early
twentieth century continued well into the middle of the
century, and the technological innovations of the greater
society continued to have a profound effect on the arts.41 Facing
alienation from a society deeply affected by war, modernists in
New York developed the abstract expressionist “school,”
expanding on the breakthroughs of the cubists and futurists.42
And even these Abstract Expressionists found acceptance
difficult at first, with “some of the avant-garde commercial
galleries hesitat[ing] to accept their paintings for exhibition.”43
The action painting of Jackson Pollock and the color-field
painting of Mark Rothko and Barnett Newman eventually put
some of this resistance to rest.44
When the Minimalists emerged later in the century, the
hard-fought emotion and humanism was gone from their
works, traded instead for “‘primary structures’ [and] basic
What
most
distinguished
geometric
volumes . . . .”45
minimalism was the increased importance of the works’
physical or environmental context—not just hanging on walls
or atop pedestals, but “rest[ing] on the floor . . . or occupy[ing] a
whole room.”46 Another shift in focus characteristic of
minimalism was the presentation of “art items that are
indistinguishable from the raw material they were made
from.”47 There is minimal differentiation between the artwork
and the non-art materials used in its creation.48 Duchamp and
his “readymades”—vacuum cleaners, bicycle wheels, urinals—
were the inspiration for this shift.49 The problem for

Id. at 605-07.
Id. at 605-09.
41 Id. at 629-30.
42 Id. at 632-33.
43 Id. at 635.
44 Id. at 635-40.
45 Id. at 645 (citation omitted).
46 Id. at 647.
47 Rikki Sapolich, When Less Isn’t More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral
Rights Model of Copyright Through a Study of Minimalist Art, 47 IDEA 453, 460 (2007)
(footnotes omitted).
48 Id.
49 Id.
39
40
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minimalists was that viewers would often be puzzled by a lack
“of the things [they] tend to expect to find within artworks.”50
B.

The Artists, Themselves

Dan Flavin was an American minimalist who devoted
the latter part of his career to, and garnered a great deal of
international attention from, a series of art installations
crafted primarily from fluorescent lighting fixtures one could
buy in any hardware store.51 The Museum of Modern Art and
the Guggenheim and Whitney museums hold a number of
Flavin’s works in their permanent collections. His work
occupies an important place in the conceptual-art movement,
and his installations are generally abstract and untitled except
for dedications to various people.52 This note concerns a work
by Flavin entitled Six alternating cool white/warm white
fluorescent lights vertical and centred (1973).53 Flavin’s
minimalist style is very context-dependent, because his works
are generally large enough to fill an entire room.
Bill Viola is an American conceptual and experimental
artist whose work has been dedicated primarily to installations
involving video.54 Viola’s work is also held by museums
internationally, and he is considered a major figure in
contemporary art, particularly for his experimental and moving
work with video. This note concerns a work by Viola entitled
Hall of Whispers.55 While Flavin and Viola challenge “traditional
sculpture,”56 they are far from rebels in the worlds of minimalist
art and video art.
One of the ironies of this litigation was that the
materials Flavin and Viola used in their sculptures, while not
very “traditional,” were hardly the most unusual. For over a
50 NANCY G. HELLER, WHY A PAINTING IS LIKE A PIZZA: A GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING AND ENJOYING MODERN ART 52 (2002).
51 Gemini G.E.L., Dan Flavin, JONIWEYL.COM, http://www.joniweyl.com/Flavin_
Bio.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2012). Dan Flavin was born in Jamaica, New York, in 1933. He
died in 1996. Id.
52 The Collection: Dan Flavin, MOMA.ORG, http://www.moma.org/collection/
artist.php?artist_id=1911 (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
53 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9; see also Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd.
v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008] UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820
[3] (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties Tribunal (London)).
54 Artist Biography, BILLVIOLA.COM, http://www.billviola.com/biograph.htm
(last visited Mar. 16, 2012). Bill Viola was born in 1951. Id.
55 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9; see also Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd.,
2008 WL 5326820, at [2].
56 For purposes of this note, “traditional sculpture” is defined as threedimensional forms cast or carved of wood, metal, or clay, often in human form.
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century artistic rebels have been “expand[ing] the vocabulary
of visual media . . . . [T]he twentieth century produced a
succession of artistic innovators, each in turn pushing
expressive norms to their limits and beyond.”57 Examples of
other non-art materials used by minimalists and other artists
are raw wood, Legos, bricks, aluminum, “rope, cigarette butts,
newsprint, taxidermic animals, latex,”58 crockery,59 bodily
fluids,60 pieces of candy,61 chewing gum,62 human hair,63
chocolate,64 soup cans,65 tiger sharks,66 money,67 and post-it
57 Nathan M. Davis, Note, As Good as New: Conserving Artwork and the
Destruction of Moral Rights, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 218 (2011).
58 Id.; see HELLER, supra note 50, at 101-07; see also Farley, supra note 19, at 822
n.54 (brick); A Mixture of Frailties, AGNEW’S GALLERY, http://www.agnewsgallery.com/
latest-acquisitions/a-mixture-of-frailties/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (latex); Artist
Database: Alisa Dworsky, ARTMAPBURLINGTON.COM, http://artmapburlington.com/
artistdatabase/?portfolio=alisa-dworsky (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (rope); Carolyn
Classen, Newsprint Artist Nick Georgiou Is Unique, TUCSON CITIZEN (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://tucsoncitizen.com/community/2010/12/06/newsprint-artist-nick-georgiou-isunique/ (newsprint); Paul Heidelberg, He Turns Raw Wood into Works of Art, SUN
SENTINEL
(July
10,
1986),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1986-07-10/news/
8602100655_1_horse-wood-cypress-warehouse (raw wood); Milwaukee Art Museum
Acquires Aluminum Slice Chair by Designer Mathias Bengtsson, EASTCITYART.COM,
http://www.eastcityart.com/2011/05/04/milwaukee-art-museum-acquires-aluminiumslice-chair-by-designer-mathias-bengtsson/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (aluminum);
Paula Mitchell Bentley, Upcycled Cigarette Butt Artwork, GREEN UPGRADER,
http://greenupgrader.com/5572/green-cigarette-butts/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012)
(cigarette butts); Rachel Poliquin, Taxidermy Artists, RAVISHING BEASTS,
http://www.ravishingbeasts.com/display/ShowJournal?moduleId=10934318&registered
AuthorId=126289&currentPage=2 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (taxidermic animals);
Nathan Sawaya, THE ART OF THE BRICK, http://www.brickartist.com/ (last visited Mar.
9, 2012) (Legos).
59 Dam Sen Park, Saigon, AMASCBLOG, http://amasc.blogspot.com/2007/12/
dam-sen-park-saigon.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
60 See Marina Galperina, 10 Artworks Made with the Artist’s Own Bodily Fluids,
FLAVORWIRE.COM, http://flavorwire.com/185770/10-artworks-made-with-the-artists-ownbodily-fluids (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
61 See Félix González-Torres: Portrait of Ross, SHAPE & COLOUR BLOG (June 23,
2010), http://shapeandcolour.wordpress.com/2010/06/23/felix-gonzalez-torres-portrait-ofross/; Stefanie Hessler, One Small Piece of Candy in Félix González-Torres’ Art, SMALL
WORLDS PROJECT (Apr. 19, 2011), http://smallworldsproject.com/?p=674.
62 See Sarah Lyall, Whimsical Works of Art, Found Sticking to the Sidewalk,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/
14/world/europe/14muswell.html.
63 See “Spooky,” Art Student Creates Hair Raising Necklaces from Human
Hair, ODDITY CENT. (June 30, 2011), http://www.odditycentral.com/news/art-studentcreates-hair-raising-necklaces-from-human-hair.html.
64 See
Jean
L.
Zaun,
Chocolate
Artistry,
WERTZ
CANDY,
http://www.wertzcandy.com/chocolate/about.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
65 See Christopher Knight, Critic’s Notebook: Was Andy Warhol’s “Campbell’s
Soup Cans” Inspired by Willem de Kooning?, L.A. TIMES (July 10, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/10/entertainment/la-ca-knight-notebook-20110710.
66 See Davis, supra note 57, at 218; Roberta Smith, Just When You Thought It
Was Safe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/arts/design/
16muse.html.
67 See JOHNNY SWING .11, http://johnnyswing.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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notes.68 These materials appear with increasing regularity on
the tags next to artworks in major museums.69 These “atypical”
materials are undeniably a part of “our cultural heritage.”70
II.

INTRODUCTION TO THE VALUE-ADDED TAX SYSTEM

The fees imposed by U.K. Customs on the Haunch of
Venison gallery included “value added tax.”71 Value-added tax
(VAT) is a form of consumption tax which is levied against
goods and services both “within the territory of [an EC member
state] . . . [and through] the importation of goods” into a
member state.72 The Sixth Council Directive implemented the
present VAT system in 1977.73 This directive “aim[ed] at a
further harmonization of the various national laws” that
developed from the first five directives.74 The implementation of
these first five directives was intended to establish “a common
market [among the EC member states] . . . whose characteristics
are similar to those of a domestic market.”75 A “harmonized”
system of tariffs (TARIC) developed out of these directives,
which established a “uniform basis for assessment” in a
“[c]ommon system of value-added tax.”76 Each member state was
required to adopt a version of the legislation into its individual
legal system.77 In the U.K., the “common market” system was
adopted in 1973 after implementation of the Second Directive.78
68 Gavon Laessig, Awesome Post-It Note Art, BUZZFEED, http://www.buzzfeed.com/
gavon/post-it-note-art (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
69 Davis, supra note 57, at 218.
70 Id.
71 Valentin & McClean, supra note 6.
72 BEN J.M. TERRA & JULIE KAJUS, INTRODUCTION TO VALUE ADDED TAX IN
THE EC 6 (1991).
73 Sixth Council Directive, 77/388/EEC, 1977 O.J. (L 145). This Directive was
published on June 13, 1977.
74 TERRA & KAJUS, supra note 72, at 8.
75 Id. at 5.
76 Sixth Council Directive, supra note 73, at 1.
77 The two primary ways in which the European Commission passes
legislation are through directives and regulations. EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFTER
MAASTRICHT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET 5
(Ralph H. Folsom et al., eds., 1996) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT]; see also art. 249 (189) of
the EC Treaty. A directive sets a policy that each member state must then adopt in a
manner appropriate for its individual system. MAASTRICHT, supra, at 5. The member
states are not always required to take any action in response to the issuance of a
directive. Id. “[D]irective[s are] ‘binding as to the result to be achieved’ but ‘leave[] to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods.’” Id. (quoting art. 189 of the Treaty of
Rome).
Regulations differ from directives in that they are immediately binding on all
member states upon their publication in the Official Journal of the European Community
(Official Journal or O.J.) and “must be complied with fully by those to whom they are
addressed.” European Parliament Fact Sheets, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 16, 2000),
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The Seventh VAT Directive was implemented in 199479
upon the recognition that, in regards to works of art, the
different systems of the various member states were causing
“distortion of competition and deflection of trade . . . .”80 This
directive established “[s]pecial arrangements applicable
to . . . works of art.”81 The Seventh Directive added language to
the previous version that lowered the taxable amount on works
of art to “a fraction of the amount” of tax applied to all other
imported goods.82 This directive had the effect of raising the
import tax on works of art in the U.K. from 2.5 percent to 5
percent.83 Of course, U.K. art dealers were upset by this increase
in import costs. They worried that this tax increase would
“undermine [their] competitiveness with the New York market.”84
The Commission, however, felt strongly that harmonizing EC
“artists’ resale rights [would] . . . put an end to various kinds of
discrimination and inequality . . . which currently exist across
the Community for visual artists and . . . allow them to achieve
parity with other categories of creative artists . . . who could
expect ongoing copyright royalties.”85
“Works of art” were defined in Article 26a, added in the
Seventh Directive,86 and this new article fit within the system of
“combined nomenclature” (CN) instituted by a 1987 amendment
to the Sixth Directive.87 This new article defined works of art, in
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/1_2_1_en.htm (citing art. 5(10) of the EC
Treaty in ¶ 2(a)). Regulations do not require the individual member states to adopt their
content through some form of their own legal system. Id. They are in force either upon
publication of the Official Journal or on a date specifically indicated in the regulation
itself. The EC regulation passed concerning Flavin’s and Viola’s works was specifically
noted to take effect twenty days after publication in the O.J. Commission Regulation 731,
supra note 14, at 2. The “decision” at issue in this note is one of these regulations—
immediately binding on all member states in the European Community and in force
upon its publication—August 11, 2010. Id.
78 Neil Warren, The UK Experience with VAT, 3 REVENUE L.J. 75, 75 (1993).
79 Id. The Seventh Directive was published on February 14, 1994 as an
amendment to the Sixth Directive. Id. For a brief discussion of the Sixth VAT
Directive, see DAVID W. WILLIAMS, EC TAX LAW 82-83, 852-86 (1998).
80 Seventh Council Directive, 94/5/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 60) 16.
81 Id.
82 Id. (art. 1(b)). Generally the taxable amount was either the price paid by
the importer or the open-market value of the goods. See Sixth Council Directive, supra
note 73, at 7 (art. 11(B)(1)(a-b)).
83 Maren Günther, Written Question to the Commission E-0551/98, 1998 O.J.
(C 223) 93.
84 Id.
85 Mr. Monti, Answer Given on Behalf of the Commission, 1998 O.J. (C 223) 94.
86 Seventh Council Directive, supra note 80, at 17.
87 Council Regulation 2658/87/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 256) 1-5. Regulation 2658
created a system of nomenclature and classification code numbers in accordance with
previously adopted regulations in order to update and assume the management of the
TARIC system (a system of integrated tariffs of the European Communities). Council
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particular sculptures, as “original sculptures and statuary, in
any material, provided that they are executed entirely by the
artist.”88 The structure of this system of combined
nomenclature allowed for expansion of the tariff classifications
at the member state level and regularized the system.89 This
1987 regulation also “laid down the general rules . . . [of]
interpretation” for this harmonized tariff system.90 The
regulation affecting Flavin and Viola (2010 regulation) was
adopted as further clarification of the 1987 regulation.91
Sellers of goods and services in the United States will only
encounter the VAT when “importing goods [or] services into the

Regulation 2658, supra, at 1-2. “The combined nomenclature shall comprise: (a) the
harmonized system nomenclature; (b) Community subdivisions to that nomenclature,
referred to as ‘CN subheadings’ in those cases where a corresponding rate of duty is
specified; and (c) preliminary provisions, additional section or chapter notes and
footnotes relating to CN subheadings.” Id. at 2 (art. 1(2)).
Each CN was assigned an eight-digit code, the first six of which indicate
the heading and subheading of the harmonized system nomenclature, with the last two
indicating the CN subheading if one is present. Id. art. 3; see also Integrated Tariff of
the European Communities (TARIC), 1993 O.J. (C 143) 8; Commission Regulation
2793/86/EEC, 1986 O.J. (L 202) (setting out the numeric codes to be used in the unified
system). Absent a subheading the last two digits would be “00.” Council Regulation
2658, supra, art. 3(1)(b). Additional digits would be added onto this code for purposes of
member state statistical subdivisions and any additional community subdivisions. Id.
art. 3(2)-(4).
The 2010 regulation affirmed the original customs classifications of the
Flavin and Viola artworks under Chapters 94 and 85, respectively. Commission
Regulation 731, supra note 11, at 2. Chapter 94 covers “miscellaneous manufactured
articles,” which includes lamps and lighting fixtures. Council Regulation 2658, supra,
at Annex Sec. XX; see also TARIC Consultation, EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS
UNION,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/taric_consultation.jsp?Lang=
en&Taric=9405&Area=US&Expand=true&SimDate=20110923#9405000000
(last
modified Mar. 19, 2012).
Chapter 85 covers, among other things, “television image and sound
recorders and reproducers.” Council Regulation 2658, supra, at Annex Sec. XVI; see also
TARIC Consultation, EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/dds2/taric/taric_consultation.jsp?Lang=en&Taric=85219000&Area=
US&Expand=true&SimDate=20110923#8521900000 (last modified Mar. 19, 2012).
88 Seventh Council Directive, supra note 80, at 24 (Annex 1(a)). The standard
classification for works of art in the TARIC system followed the language of the Seventh
Directive. These definitions were placed within Chapter 97 under Section XXI of TARIC
entitled “Works of Art, Collectors’ Pieces and Antiques.” Council Regulation 2658, supra
note 87, at Annex Sec. XXI; see also TARIC Consultation, EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS
UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/measures.jsp?Lang=en&SimDate=
20110923&Area=US&Taric=9703000000&LangDescr=en (last modified Mar. 19, 2012).
Under this chapter, heading 9703 is the CN code for “[o]riginal sculptures and statuary, in
any material.” Id. Neither the Seventh Directive nor TARIC goes any further in describing
what might qualify as sculpture under this harmonized system heading. Id.
89 Council Regulation 2658, supra note 87, at 1.
90 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 2.
91 Id. The Flavin/Viola amendments were not the only ones made by the
Commission at that time. See Commission Regulation 732, 2010 O.J. (L 214) 4 (EU).
Many other amendments have been made over time.
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EU [member states]” from the United States.92 This import tax is
generally paid by the buyer of the goods or services, and does not
apply to goods with only a de minimis value.93 The tax is
“chargeable at the time when [the] goods enter the [member
state].”94 The standard VAT rate among EU member states ranges
from 15 to 25 percent.95
III.

THE INTERSECTION OF ART AND THE LAW

When courts approach the problem of classification of
artworks for tax and import duty purposes, deference is
generally correctly given to the vicissitudes of the art world.96
Courts, both in the United States and abroad, have customarily
declined to act as arbiters of taste.97 What may not have been
considered “art” ten, twenty, or fifty years ago might now be
recognized as valuable by experts and the art world. There is a
continued risk, as evidenced by the 2010 regulation, that
vanguard contemporary artworks may still be denied their
status as art. Neither the U.S. judiciary nor courts and
legislative bodies abroad should permit this unfortunate and
shortsighted result. Part III explores the U.K. approach to this
problem, both in the context of the Flavin/Viola matter and
through earlier EU jurisprudence. As to the domestic approach,
the United States has had fewer occasions to address this
question, though one case in particular concerned the
importation of an abstract sculpture that was initially charged
92 Tax Advisors Planning System, Title 43, 43:13:01(E) Imports Into the EU
(RIA 2011) (referencing Sixth EC VAT Directive, art. 70).
93 Id.
94 Sixth VAT Directive: Uniform Basis of Assessment, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/other/l31006_en.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2007); Sixth
Directive, supra note 73, at 7 (tit. VII, art. 10, sec. 3).
95 Tax Advisors Planning System, Title 43, 43:13:01(C) Value Added Tax
(VAT) Rates (RIA 2011). As of Directive No. 77/388, the minimum tax must be at least 15
percent in each member state. Sixth VAT Directive, supra note 94. The minimum rate
was increased as of January 1, 2011. This caused much consternation among those
affected by the undiscounted VAT rate on imports, as the minimum then increased to 20
percent. See Accounting for VAT When the Standard Rate of VAT Returned to 17.5 Per
Cent, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/forms-rates/rates/ratechanges.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012); Increase in the Standard Rate of VAT to 20 Per
Cent, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/forms-rates/rates/rateincrease.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
96 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903);
Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428, 430-31 (Cust. Ct. 1928); Haunch of
Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008] UKVAT (Customs) C00266, 2008 WL 5326820 (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties Tribunal (London)).
97 See, e.g., Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251; Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008
WL 5326820 at [50]-[51].
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import tax on the basis of its component material.98 The U.S.
court, just as the U.K. Tribunal did with Flavin and Viola,
found the work product to indeed be art.99 There are still other
methods by which courts and legislatures can approach this
issue, and those are suggested and discussed in Part IV.
A.

Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. H.M. Revenue &
Customs

The heart of this inquiry is the dispute over customs
bills charged to London’s Haunch of Venison gallery when it
imported the contemporary sculptures of Dan Flavin and Bill
Viola. Both works were imported in a disassembled state and
subject to a tariff rate normally charged to goods and component
parts intended for further sale or assembly.100 In other words,
the customs officials assessed the light tubes and video
equipment as light tubes and video equipment, not as
disassembled artworks packed in boxes. Ironically, they assessed
the tariff on the estimated value of the assembled pieces—in
their final form as artworks.101 Thus the customs officials
acknowledged the imports were valuable as artwork, but
simultaneously denied them the reduced tariff rate.102
1. 2006–2008: Trouble with U.K. Customs
The Haunch of Venison gallery appealed the customs
bill because Flavin’s and Viola’s sculptures were not assessed
under the discounted rate normally reserved for works of art.103
When the artworks were first imported, customs officials
declared that the works were subject to the full VAT (then 17.5
percent).104 The gallery brought a lawsuit against HM Revenue
& Customs (HMRC) protesting this classification before the
London VAT and Duties Tribunal in 2008.105 The gallery sought
relief from the tariff assessment by arguing that the artworks—
even in their disassembled state—qualified for the discounted rate
See Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 428-29; see also infra Part III.B.
See Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 431; see also infra Part III.B.
100 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820 at [18].
101 Irina Tarsis, Of Art and Tax: The EU Commission on Customs Code Redefines
Art for Tax Purposes, CARDOZO JURIST (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.cardozojurist.com/2011/
02/of-art-and-tax-the-eu-commission-on-customs-code-redefines-art-for-tax-purposes/;
Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9.
102 See sources cited supra note 101.
103 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820 at [18].
104 Tarsis, supra note 101.
105 See generally Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820.
98
99
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reserved for artworks.106 The trial lasted four days, during which
the Tribunal visited the Tate galleries to view similar Flavin and
Viola works.107 The Tribunal also heard testimony from “[s]everal
high profile witnesses” as to the correctness of the customs
officials’ classifications.108 HMRC’s central concern was that
treating imported goods that do not appear to be traditional
artworks as art would open the door to “any
importer . . . declar[ing] any goods to be works of art and thereby
circumvent[ing] the positive rates of duty.”109 HMRC argued that
the particular components in this case should be considered not
as unassembled artworks but instead according to their
“objective characteristics,”110 namely as light bulbs and DVD
players.111 HMRC also argued that sculptures could not be only
two dimensional.112 This related particularly to the Viola works,
projection[s] emanating from the screen which is itself a flat object
and [about which HMRC contended] . . . it is simply incorrect as a
matter of fact to consider the mechanism by which that image is
realized as being part of a sculpture even if that mechanism does
have a three dimensional form.113

The Tribunal dismissed both of these concerns. These
pieces qualified as sculpture by virtue of “all the components
[having been chosen] deliberately and as part of the artistic
process with a view to achieving [the] artistic intention with
the greatest effect.”114 The Tribunal did not expressly require
engagement with the third dimension. It found instead that
these components included the structure by which the
projectors and screens would be hung, the materials and
equipment selected for the projectors and screens, and the
specific spatial arrangement of these elements for the actual
installation.115 The combination of these elements satisfied the
Tribunal’s definition of sculpture.116

Id. at [4].
Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9.
108 Id.
109 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820, at [39].
110 Id. at [36], [40] (citing Case C-35/93, Develop Dr Eisbein GmbH & Co. v.
Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-West, 1994 E.C.R. I-2655).
111 Id.
112 Id. at [35].
113 Id.
114 Id. at [48].
115 Id. at [49]-[51].
116 Id.
106
107
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The Tribunal also dismissed HMRC’s more central
concern⎯“that importers might declare just anything as works
of art” to evade duty rates.117 The Tribunal declared it
absurd to classify any of these works[, in their unassembled form,] as
components ignoring the fact that the components together make a
work of art. . . . It stretches the objective characteristics principle too
far to say that a work of art is no longer a work of art if it is
dismantled for transportation . . . .118

The Tribunal also noted that “where there is doubt about a
classification . . . , preference should be given to one of the
Chapter 97 headings over those of any other Chapter.”119 Having
negated both of HMRC’s main arguments, the Tribunal concluded
that these works should be classified as sculptures and are
thereby subject to the lesser VAT rate.120 Appeals were allowed by
the Tribunal, but as of this writing HMRC has not appealed.
The Tribunal relied upon Develop Dr Eisbein GmbH &
Co. v. Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-West, which addressed tariff
classifications for articles imported in an unassembled or
disassembled state.121 The parts at issue in Eisbein GmbH were
photocopier parts and accessories.122 The classifications,
although made by German customs officials, ultimately utilized
the same EU harmonized tariff system that the U.K. customs
officials applied to Flavin and Viola.123 Imports of fullyassembled apparatuses into Germany owe an additional
antidumping duty, and this duty was imposed in Eisbein
GmbH.124 The importer appealed, arguing that the parts were
not fully-assembled photocopiers and thus not subject to the
duty.125 The importer relied on the Explanatory Notes to the
antidumping rule, which included simply-assembled articles
(i.e., apparatuses) in the “fully assembled” category.126 These
Id. at [50].
Id. at [49]-[51].
119 Id. at [44] (discussing Case 155/84, Onnasch v. Hauptzollamt BerlinPackhof, 1987 E.C.R. 1449). For a discussion of the various classification “Chapters,”
see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text; see also infra note 149.
120 Id. at [51]. Such a classification would also exempt the works from a
separate customs duty of 3.7 percent, which was charged to the gallery. Valentin,
European Definition, supra note 16.
121 Case C-35/93, Develop Dr Eisbein GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt StuttgartWest, 1994 E.C.R. I-2655, at [3].
122 Id.
123 Id. at [1].
124 Id. at [4] (discussing the antidumping duty under Regulation 2640/86/EEC,
1986 O.J. (L 239) 5).
125 Id. at [6].
126 Id.
117
118
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were described as “articles the components of which are to be
assembled” using only simple instructions.127 The importer
argued that the components of a photocopier require highly
specialized staff for assembly, and that therefore assembly
cannot be accomplished with simple instructions.128 Thus, the
photocopiers were neither “unassembled” requiring simple
assembly nor “fully assembled,” the antidumping rule did not
apply, and the parts should be treated solely as components.129
Customs officials argued that the requirement of highly
specialized staff did not take these articles out of the “simple
assembly” category.130 They argued that this only occurs when
“changes to . . . the part in question [would be required] in the
course of the production process.”131
The court disagreed with the importer, asserting instead
that “highly qualified specialized staff” does not mean the
assembly was not “simple,”132 and further, that neither “the
assembly technique [nor] the complexity of the assembly method”
should be taken into account when classifying components for
customs purposes.133 The court defined simple assembly in the
negative: “parts [that] have to undergo major processing before
assembly . . . [do] not have the relevant essential character” of
the final product.134 The inverse of that argument is that parts
that do not have to undergo major processing do “have the
relevant essential character of the final product.”135
Flavin’s and Viola’s installation components may have
technical and specific assembly instructions, but they do not
require major processing before assembly, as raw materials
might. Thus, these component light bulbs, projectors, and
screens can be understood to possess the “relevant essential
character” necessary for classification under Eisbein GmbH as
their final forms—sculptures and works of art. This distinction
implies that, unless changes to the forms of Flavin’s and Viola’s
installation components needed to take place, they should be
classified as the full apparatus when imported. The rule in
Eisbein GmbH makes this even plainer: “[F]or tariff purposes an
article presented unassembled or disassembled must be
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at [6]-[7].
Id. at [8].
Id.
Id. at [17]-[23].
Id. at [19].
Id. at [12].
Id.
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regarded as a complete article. No reference is made to the
assembly technique which must be applied in order to produce
the finished product.”136 Simple assembly or major processing
requirements aside, if disassembled products “must be regarded
as a complete article,”137 it is clear that the Tribunal relied on
the holding in Eisbein GmbH in making its decision regarding
Flavin’s and Viola’s works.
2. 2008–Today: The Reaction of the European Commission
Within weeks of the Tribunal decision, “the issue [of the
Flavin and Viola imports] was on the agenda of the EC Customs
Code Committee . . . .”138 The committee knew that two member
states (the U.K. and Holland) “had held that video installations
should be classified as sculptures[,]” while other member states
“expressed the view that components of video installations
should be taxed individually (e.g. as video projectors).”139 Within
one year, and “without apparent further consideration or
consultation, the committee decided that a draft regulation
[would] be prepared for a future meeting—[one that would]
overturn the UK and Dutch National Court decisions.”140
This proposal was before the Customs Code Committee
by June 2010;141 acting under the 1987 regulation it “was
adopted at the [August] meeting and supported by the UK.”142
The new regulation’s sole concern was the classification of
these specific artworks by Flavin and Viola. Although the 1987
regulation allows for changes to be made to the harmonized
system that relate to “changes in requirements relating to
statistics or commercial policy,”143 there are no claims or
references made in the text of the 2010 regulation to any such
changes in “statistics or commercial policy”144 driving this
amendment. As a regulation, this change to the tariff
classification system CN was effective immediately upon its

Id.
Id.
138 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9. This was discovered through a Freedom of
Information request made by Pierre Valentin, the attorney representing the gallery in
the 2008 Tribunal matter. Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
141 Id.
142 Id.; Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 2.
143 Council Regulation 2658, supra note 87, at 4 (art. 9(b)).
144 Id.
136
137
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publication in the Official Journal, which made it binding on all
member states.145
The artworks at the center of the 2010 regulation were
described objectively, without any reference to the artists’
names or the names of the works.146 Under the heading
“Description of the goods,” Bill Viola’s video work was listed as:
A video-sound installation consisting essentially of the following
components:
-- 10 video reproducing apparatus of the digital versatile disc (DVD)
type,
-- 10 projectors using matrix liquid crystal display (LCD) technology,
of a kind also capable of displaying digital information generated by
an automatic data-processing machine,
-- 10 single self-powered loudspeakers, mounted in their enclosures,
and
-- 20 digital versatile discs (DVDs) containing recorded works of
“modern art” in the form of images accompanied by sound.
The appearance of the video reproducing apparatus, the projectors
and the loudspeakers has been modified by an artist with a view to
appear as a work of “modern art” without altering their function.147

Dan Flavin’s sculpture was described as:
A so-called “light installation” consisting of six circular fluorescent
lighting tubes and six lighting fittings of plastics.
It has been designed by an artist and operates in accordance with
instructions provided by the artist. It is intended to be displayed in a
gallery, fixed to the wall.
The fittings are separate from each other and are intended to be
mounted vertically.
The tubes are to be placed into the fittings, providing two
alternating shades of white.148

Each of these two descriptions was assigned a
classification code: Viola’s work was assigned to TARIC Chapter
85 (Electrical Machinery and Equipment) and Flavin’s to
145 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 2. The regulation actually
provided that the regulation was “to enter into force on the 20th day following its
publication in the Official Journal.” Id. (art. 3) (emphasis omitted). With the date of
publication at August 14, 2010, the regulation would be effective as of September 3, 2010.
146 Nevertheless, those familiar with the matter would have no trouble
making out to what the EC was referring. Id. at 3.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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Chapter 94 (Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles).149 The
reasons given for the classifications range from the presumptive
to the “absurd.”150 For Flavin’s work, the Commission claimed
that “[c]lassification under [Chapter 97] as a sculpture is
excluded, as it is not the installation that constitutes a ‘work of
art’ but the result of the operations (the light effect) carried out
by it.”151 The Commission asserted that Viola’s “video-sound
installation is neither composite goods, as it rather consists of
individual components, nor goods put up in sets for retail
sale . . . . Consequently, the components of [both] installation[s]
are to be classified separately.”152 The thrust of the Commission’s
reasoning can be found in the following section of the regulation:
Classification under [Chapter 97] as a sculpture is excluded, as none of
the individual components or the whole installation, when assembled,
can be considered as a sculpture. The components have been slightly
modified by the artists, but these modifications do not alter their
preliminary function of goods of Section XVI. It is the content recorded
on the DVD which, together with the components of the installation,
provides for the “modern art.”153

The concern here is whether these works are classifiable
as “sculpture.” Chapter 97 of TARIC only specifies that a
sculpture be of “any material.”154 Nothing in that chapter
attempts to define or give features to any of the categories of
art mentioned (sculpture is not the only category).155 The
Tribunal judges in 2008 had no trouble recognizing these works
149 Chapter 85 under Section XVI of TARIC is entitled “Electrical Machinery
and Equipment and Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders and Reproducers, Television Image
and Sound Recorders and Reproducers, and Parts and Accessories of Such Articles.”
Council Regulation 2658, supra note 87, at Annex Sec. XVI; see also TARIC Consultation,
EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/
taric/taric_consultation.jsp?Lang=en&Taric=85219000&Area=US&Expand=true&Sim
Date=20110923#8521900000 (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). Viola’s work was classified
under codes 8521 90 00, 8528 69 10, 8518 21 00, and 8523 40 51.
Chapter 94 under Section XX of TARIC is entitled “Furniture; Bedding,
Mattresses, Mattress Supports, Cushions and Similar Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and
Lighting Fittings, Not Elsewhere Specified or Included; Illuminated Signs, Illuminated
Nameplates and the Like; Prefabricated Buildings.” Council Regulation 2658, supra note
87, at Annex Sec. XX; see also TARIC Consultation, EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS
UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/taric_consultation.jsp?Lang=en&
Taric=9405&Area=US&Expand=true&SimDate=20110923#9405000000 (last visited
Mar. 23, 2012). Flavin’s work was classified under code 9405 10 28.
150 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008]
UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820, at [49] (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties
Tribunal (London)).
151 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 3.
152 Id.
153 Id. (emphasis added).
154 Council Regulation 2658, supra note 87, at Annex sec. XXI.
155 Id.
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in their assembled states as sculptures and artworks.156 The
Tribunal also found it a “stretch” to refuse to recognize the
components as the equivalent of their finished, assembled
form.157 The dictionary defines sculpture as “the product of the
sculptor’s art,”158 as well as “a three dimensional work of art.”159
While neither definition clarifies the matter, the judicial
system has traditionally relied on the art maker and the art
community to affirm a work as art.160 The members of the
Commission, however, applied some other analysis to this same
question, though the regulation does not make clear the
principles they based their decision upon.161
The Commission’s reasoning disregards the U.K. VAT
Tribunal’s 2008 decision. Since the component parts of Flavin’s
and Viola’s installations are both presented disassembled, the
Commission holds, they must be classified by their individual
components.162 But the Commission also declares that, even
assembled, these works are not art.163 The Commission believes
displaying the images contained on the Viola DVDs is the final
step necessary for his work to become sculpture.164 It reasons
similarly with Flavin’s work, claiming that the addition of a
“light effect” to the arrangement of light tubes creates the
art.165 The Commission distinguishes between “art effects” and
assembled, non-art components, which it finds necessary but
not sufficient to constitute a finished work. If this distinction
holds, the “art effect” of, for example, Flavin’s work could never
be conveyed: it is a “light effect,” something that could not be
shipped or taxed because it is not a material. Even more
troubling, the Commission does not follow its own rule when it
assesses the nondiscounted VAT rate for the supposed non-art
components; it assesses VAT on the value of the finished
artwork, which is much higher than the value of industrial

156 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008]
UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820, at [47]-[49] (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties
Tribunal (London)).
157 Id. at [51].
158 Sculpture
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sculpture (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).
159 Sculpture
Definition,
OXFORD
ENG.
DICTIONARY
ONLINE,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sculpture?q=sculpture (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
160 See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
161 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 3.
162 Id. at 3.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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light bulbs and DVD players combined.166 The Commission is
willing to use the value of the art works as a basis for the tax,
but it refuses to grant the components of unassembled works
the discounted status granted to art.167
Non-art components are necessary components of
certain artworks. “Art effects” require their non-art
components, and the Commission acknowledges this critical
interplay, though only nominally.168 These artists expressly
desired the “light effect” and the DVD images to be produced
with these screens and light tubes arranged in a certain way,
and the Commission also acknowledges this intention.169 And
while true that these works rely on certain non-material, nonart components, under the Commission’s standard, it is
impossible to import any kind of artwork that employs
electricity in its final form under the discounted VAT rate for
artworks. This standard is too high. If a court accepted the
Commission’s standard, any work that uses infrastructure
upon its completion—pressurized water for a fountain,
electrical plugs for a neon sculpture, wind for chimes—may not
be classified as art, but rather a composition of non-art
components. A work would only become art in its intended
context or ultimate form—when the play button is pressed or
the electrical current is live. This is akin to legislating that
artworks that are intended for a particular context are “not
art” until they are actually placed in that context. Under this
standard, a fully assembled Flavin work would cease to be an
artwork once the gallery closed for the night and the janitor
turned off the lights.170 This standard thus requires that an
artwork be continually connected to every element of its
context in order to remain art.171

Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9.
Id.
168 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 3.
169 Id.
170 Pierre Valentin asked a similar question in a series of opinion pieces
published by The Art Newspaper. See, e.g., Valentin, European Definition, supra note
16.
171 Interestingly, Duchamp’s Fountain was never intended to be connected to
a plumbing source. His intention was to keep it freestanding and unconnected to any
piece of infrastructure, but for its platform. William Camfield, Marcel Duchamp’s
Fountain: Its History and Aesthetics in the Context of 1917, in MARCEL DUCHAMP:
ARTIST OF THE CENTURY 78 (Rudolf E. Kuenzli and Francis M. Naumann, eds., 4th
prtg. 1996). Under the Commission’s ruling, there would be no “art effects” of
Duchamp’s piece because it is free of infrastructure and context; thus it would not be
ruled as a protected sculptural artwork.
166
167
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More significantly, this standard separates the artist’s
work product from the art itself. The Commission asserts that
the art is found when the artist’s work product is added to a
particular infrastructure or context, but of course that final
element is generally outside of the artist’s control. Creating the
art is not the accomplishment of the gallery owner who turns on
the lights! The problem is that this standard creates no account
in the law for what “art” is at all. Recall the definition of
sculpture under the TARIC classification—“original sculptures
and statuary, in any material, provided that they are executed
entirely by the artist . . . .”172 The Commission’s standard, which
places the work done by the context and infrastructure ahead of
the work done by the artist, is clearly operating outside of the
harmonized system.
B.

U.S. Analogues in Customs Duties

The United States does not have a consumption tax or
VAT system, but there are customs duties imposed on
imports.173 By statute, art works are exempt from these
customs duties.174 Courts will occasionally need to determine if
an import is a work of art in order to decide upon the proper
customs duty.175 There are a handful of cases in the United
States that address relevant import duties, but they were
decided under an earlier iteration of the customs code. This
historical precedent is still instructive, however, when
evaluating the recent Commission regulation.
One of the most famous of these cases involved a simple
sculpture cast from bronze that the customs officials had trouble
classifying as a “sculpture.”176 Interestingly, this rather
“sensational lawsuit . . . captured the attention of American
public opinion for two years.”177 This 1928 U.S. Customs Court
decision concerning Constantin Brancusi’s Bird in Space
sculpture is the U.S. case that most closely parallels the Flavin
and Viola matter in both the facts and the court’s reasoning.178
Seventh Council Directive, supra note 80, at 24 (Annex 1(a)) (emphasis added).
See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006) (briefly discussing the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States).
174 Farley, supra note 19, at 822 (citing Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590, 684 (1930),
19 U.S.C. § 1201, P1807 (1958), amended by Pub. L. No. 86-262, 73 Stat. 549 (1959)).
175 Id.
176 See Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928).
177 André Paleologue, Afterword to BRANCUSI VS. UNITED STATES: THE
HISTORIC TRIAL, 1928, at 118 (English-language ed., Adam Biro 1999).
178 Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 428. In the case, the sculpture is referred to as
Bird in Flight. Id.
172
173
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Brancusi’s sculpture was subject to an import duty upon its
entry into the United States because the sculpture did not
exactly resemble a “bird.”179 In the United States at the time,
sculptures were exempt from import duties as “zero-rated works
of art.”180 Customs, refusing to classify the sculpture as such,
subjected the “bird” to a 40 percent import duty, the rate
generally applied to manufactures of metal.181 Photographer
Edward Steichen had purchased the sculpture; he paid the duty
and then went to court to protest the determination.182 The court
eventually agreed with Steichen, and his $240 was returned.183
The Customs Court acknowledged that under the Tariff
Act of 1922 artworks were entitled to duty-free entry, as
opposed to “manufacture[s] of metal” which would be subject to
a tariff of “40 per cent ad valorem.”184 The court wrote into its
opinion the entire list of materials and processes included
under the Tariff Act’s “art and sculpture” heading.185 While the
Tariff Act does not make this list explicitly exclusive, all of the
“traditional” materials of sculpture are included, and the statute
did not indicate that any “non-traditional” artwork or materials
should be read into the list.186 Even while the court conceded
that “the exercise of rather a vivid imagination” is required to
see the Brancusi sculpture as even resembling a bird,187 it held
that the sculpture, crafted from traditional materials, warranted
the discounted duty under the Tariff Act.188

Id. at 429.
Kennedy, supra note 14.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Margit Rowell, Preface to BRANCUSI VS. UNITED STATES, supra note 177, at
9. The Guardian lists this amount as $600. Kennedy, supra note 10.
184 Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 428. “Ad valorem” taxes are taxes “based on the
assessed value of [the] real estate or personal property” at issue. Ad Valorem Tax,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/advaloremtax.asp#axzz1rCwgDuPW
(last visited Apr. 5, 2012). A familiar example of an ad valorem tax is municipal property tax.
185 Id. at 428-29. Paragraph 1704 of the Tariff Act of 1922 specified that
“sculpture” was to be understood as:
179
180

professional productions of sculptors only, whether in round or in relief, in
bronze, marble, stone, terra cotta, ivory, wood, or metal, or whether cut,
carved, or otherwise wrought by hand from the solid block or mass of marble,
stone, or alabaster, or from metal, or cast in bronze or other metal or
substance, or from wax or plaster, made as the professional productions of
sculptors only . . . .
Id. at 428.
186
187
188

Id.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 431.
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The court applied a three-part test: (1) was this the work
of a professional, (2) was this an original work, and (3) was this
an article of utility?189 Despite contradictory testimony, the
court answered the first two questions affirmatively: “There is
no question in the mind of the court but that the man who
produced the [sculpture] is a professional sculptor, . . . [and w]e
also find it is an original production.”190 The court would need
to answer the third question in the negative for the work to
qualify as an artwork under the Act.191 Interestingly, the court
addressed this question somewhat inversely. Instead of saying
whether this piece was an article of utility, the court set out to
determine whether it was a “work of art.”192 The court
acknowledged a strong precedent that would suggest this work
be denied this categorization.193
Nevertheless, the court favored a more contemporary
approach.194 In recognizing the “so-called new school of art” the
court accepted an art movement “whose exponents attempt to
portray abstract ideas rather than to imitate natural objects.”195
While the majority stated that it did not have to agree or be “in
sympathy with these newer ideas[,]” the court held that it must
recognize the change.196 The court stated that “the fact of [the
new art movements’] existence and their influence upon the art
world as recognized by the courts must be considered.”197 The
Brancusi object was “beautiful and symmetrical in outline, and
while some difficulty might be encountered in associating it
with a bird, it is nevertheless pleasing to look at and highly
ornamental . . . .”198 Thus, the court recognized the metal
production as a sculpture and a piece of art, and granted it free
entry under the Tariff Act.199 The court relied on the principle of
“objective acceptance,” which subordinates conflicting subjective
responses of the court to expert testimonials. This principle
recognizes the shifting trends of the art world, and should have
been employed by the Commission when assessing Flavin’s and
Viola’s works, though this rubric likely needs additional structure.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 429.
191 Id. at 428 (citing Paragraph 1704 of the Tariff Act of 1922).
192 Id. at 430.
193 Id. The court even discussed briefly the reasoning and holding in United States
v. Olivotti, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46 (1916). See infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
194 Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 430.
195 Id. at 430-31.
196 Id. at 431.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
189
190
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At the very least, the Commission should have explained why it did
not analyze the works under this “objective acceptance” principle.
In Part IV of this note, other rubrics will be discussed that offer
more structure but still maintain this objective character.200
Two other U.S. Customs Court cases (one that predated
Brancusi and another that followed four decades after)
addressed questions that relate to the parts versus wholes,
components versus finished products issues. In one case, the
intention to use the pieces of the work as a unit determined the
imports being considered a whole.201 In the other, a marble
“sculpture,” which was only decorative and failed to rise to the
level of fine art, was found not to be an artwork by the court.202
In Miniature Fashions, Inc. v. United States, importers
appealed a decision classifying patterned cotton shirts and
shorts imported from Japan as separates.203 This classification
subjected the clothing to a rate of 25 percent ad valorem under
the Tariff Act of 1930.204 Plaintiffs in the suit contended that
the sets⎯designed, manufactured, and sold together as
“cabana sets”⎯were instead “entireties for tariff purposes.”205
They argued that these “entireties” should be assessed under
the “Other” category under the same section of the Tariff Act,
which covered articles of clothing manufactured “wholly or in
part . . . of cotton, and not specially provided for [elsewhere in
the Act].”206 Articles falling under this “Other” category were
only subject to a rate of 20 percent ad valorem.207 Witnesses for
the plaintiffs testified that the sets were “inexpensive . . . [and]
have very little . . . value when separated.”208 The Customs Court
found the articles to be separates because the shirts and shorts
would remain functionally the same even upon separation:
“[A]lthough these cabana sets were designed . . . for sale
together, . . . the functions of the several parts of the set were no
different from what they would otherwise have been had the sets
not been so coordinated. . . . [T]he shirt continued to be a shirt
and the shorts remained shorts.”209

200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

See infra Part IV.
Miniature Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 55 Cust. Ct. 154 (1965).
United States v. Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46 (1916).
Miniature Fashions, 55 Cust. Ct. at 155.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 156.

1690

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:4

The importers’ appeal focused on proving that trends in
fashion, with an emphasis on dual-purpose apparel
manufacturing, were determinative of whether these pieces were
“entireties” and not separates.210 The court admitted “that [while]
a changing popular attitude played a role in the conclusions
reached in [cases like Brancusi v. United States], we do not
believe that [those] decisions actually rested upon this factor.”211
The court declared that “a designer’s conception of ‘fashion’ or ‘eye
appeal’” is not sufficient to overcome previous policy of the court:
If what is imported as a unit is actually . . . two or more individual
entities which, even though imported joined or assembled together,
nevertheless, retain their individual identities and are not
subordinated to the identity of the combination, duties will be imposed
upon the individual entities in the combination as though they had
been imported separately. Conversely, if there are imported in one
importation separate entities, which by their nature are obviously
intended to be used as a unit, or to be joined together by mere assembly,
and in such use or joining the individual identities of the separate
entities are subordinated to the identity of the combined entity, duty
will be imposed upon the entity they represent.212

Therefore, the question of subordinated identity was the
determining factor for the Customs Court, and applying that
concept to Flavin and Viola is instructive. The Commission
argues that the imposed VAT rate should apply to the
functional components of Flavin’s and Viola’s works. But, the
Commission also concedes that the works take on a separate,
unified identity when assembled and “used as a unit[,]”213 in the
words of the Miniature Fashions court.214 This qualified
concession as to the “unified identity” of the Flavin and Viola
works is inconsistent with the Commission’s claim that the value
on which tax should be calculated is the value of the unit as an
artwork rather than the value of the individual components.215
Closer to the realm of sculpture, the question of whether
carved marble objects were dutiable as “manufactures of
marble” valued on their component material or as works of art
arose in United States v. Olivotti.216 Valued on their component
material, the marble boxes and plinths at issue would have
Id. at 157.
Id. at 158.
212 Id. at 160 (emphasis added) (quoting Donalds Ltd. v. United States, 32
Cust. Ct. 310 (1954)).
213 Id.
214 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 3.
215 See Tarsis, supra note 101.
216 United States v. Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46, 47 (1916).
210
211
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been subject to a 45 percent ad valorem duty the Tariff Act of
1913; but, if classified as works of art under a different
paragraph the applicable duty rate would have been 15 percent
ad valorem.217 The government appealed the decision of the
Board of General Appraisers, which found the marble works to
fall within the 15 percent rate as works of art.218 The board had
reasoned that since Greek temples were art by virtue of simply
being sculpture, these pieces must be art as well.219 The Court
of Customs Appeals was not as easily satisfied, reasoning that
one of the pieces being “the work of a sculptor[,] . . . . fashioned
from solid marble[,]” and “artistic and beautiful” was insufficient
“to constitute a sculpture.”220 The court in Olivotti was ultimately
unwilling to expand the reach of Paragraph 376 to include the
decorative and undeniably sculptural, even beautiful, qualities of
the marble pieces in question, holding that neither the marble
font nor the marble seats were sculptures or works of fine art
dutiable at the lower rate.221 “That everything artistic and
beautiful can not [sic] be classed as fine art was well established
in [a Supreme Court decision],” which held that concededly
beautiful paintings on glass windows “were representative of the
decorative and industrial rather than of the fine arts.”222
In Olivotti, the court addressed decorative elements
that, when added to functional objects (or precious stone), did
not rise to the level of artworks. This is distinguishable from
Flavin’s and Viola’s use of nondecorative components that
themselves comprise an artwork. Olivotti holds that the
decorative elements of a finished commercial product may not
elevate it to the classification of “sculpture” or “artwork.” But,
the European Commission correctly understands that Flavin’s
light tubes and Viola’s DVD players were not decorative
elements of the installations. Haunch of Venison did not argue
that decorative elements made these sculptures art; instead, the
gallery argued it was the artists’ intentions, along with their

217 Id; see also Paragraphs 98 (“Manufactures of marble, etc.”) and 376
(“Paintings, drawings, etc.”) of the Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 123, 151 (1913), ch.
16, paras. 98, 376.
218 Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 47.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 48. At this time the court was still hewing closely to the conception of
sculpture being mainly representative of “natural objects, chiefly the human form.” Id.
Twelve years later in Brancusi, the court recognized this traditional understanding but
gently put it to the side in light of the changing tides of contemporary art. See supra
notes 176-98 and accompanying text.
221 Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 49.
222 Id. (citing United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71, 74 (1892)).
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reception by the art world, that made the works art.223 Thus
Olivotti is not on point in this matter. In any event, Brancusi
removes any lingering doubts that even basic materials can be
deserving of tax discounts offered to works of art by virtue of
their artistic manipulation by artists into artworks.224
IV.

CRITIQUES AND SUGGESTIONS

The “tension between the law and the evolution of ideas
in modern or avant garde art”225 can lead to the protectionist
tendencies seen in the U.K. customs officials’ worries about
retail imports classified under false pretenses. The law is
insistent upon “taxonomiz[ing and classifying] artistic
creations,” while the avant-garde is making valiant efforts to
be “whatever [one] can get away with.”226 On a fundamental
level, this tension might always exist because “law is about
precedent whereas art is about the evolution of ideas.”227 The
law cannot be expected to accommodate such a broad (and
shifting) definition of art,228 but, significantly, “[a]rt is not apart
from the law.”229 Often with conceptual art, “extrinsic
circumstances” and context must be taken into account to
properly classify the works.230 If a work is accepted within the
context of the “art world,” that is sometimes the full extent to
which it is validated as art.231 The law’s inherent structure is at
odds particularly with a school of art that requires a certain
amount of context in its presentation. The troubles foreseen by
U.K. customs officials—an open door for importers to call any
shipped product “art”—is rooted here. For some of the more
conceptual artworks, testimony as to their legitimacy will grow
in necessity and importance. The alleged or potential burden of
such a requirement, however, is not a justification for blanket
legislation that makes even legitimate imports impossible.
223 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008]
UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820 (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties Tribunal
(London)).
224 See Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928).
225 Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and Conceptual Art and VARA,
12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 213 (2010) (quoting Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04
C 07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)).
226 Id.
227 Farley, supra note 19, at 807.
228 Cronin, supra note 225, at 213.
229 Farley, supra note 19, at 808.
230 Cronin, supra note 225, at 236.
231 See generally Arthur C. Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. PHIL. 571 (1964); see
also Farley, supra note 19, at 844 (discussing Danto and “institutionalism”).
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The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), adopted by
Congress in 1990 to broaden general copyright protections to
include artists producing physical “work[s] of visual art,”232
attempts to resolve some of the art versus law dispute by
establishing criteria which obviate subjective classification.
While VARA is not without criticism, it makes inroads to
recognizing the “moral rights” of artists in a way that the
United States has not previously done. VARA gives credence to
both the claims of the artists themselves (in declaring a visual
work “art”) and the claims of the art world and its specialists
(in recognizing or lauding a visual work as “art”).233 The foreign
nations that are signatories to the Berne Convention accept a
similar convention in the “droit morale” protections offered to
artists in those jurisdictions. The copyright protections under
VARA—echoes of droit morale—bridge art and law, and may
offer an effective legal rubric for the assessment of art for tax
and other purposes. The Tribunal that heard the 2008 Haunch
of Venison lawsuit has already employed this standard: it took
testimony from experts in the art world and made sure to
ascertain that Flavin and Viola were indeed bona fide artists—
that they had “recognized stature.”234 This part will further
discuss these and other possible “bridges” between art and law.
A.

Problems for Conceptual Art

Contemporary, conceptual art has a difficult status in
society and in the law. Part of the problem is that “the ‘plain
and ordinary’ meanings of words describing modern art”235
cannot keep pace with the developments within these art styles
and types. The law has equal difficulty determining how to
treat these types of developing works. As discussed below,
VARA offers protection of certain artists’ rights for works of a
“recognized stature.”236 Some scholars read this to mean that
VARA only protects “the most revered work of the Old
Masters.”237 Yet others see the low bar on creativity in the
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006); see also Cronin, supra note 225, at 209.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
234 See Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs,
[2008] UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820 (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties
Tribunal (London)).
235 Cronin, supra note 225, at 213 (quoting Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C
07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)).
236 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). See infra Part IV.B.
237 Cronin, supra note 225, at 213 (citing Kelley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791,
at *11).
232
233
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copyright standards as allowing for artwork with only a
minimal level of original, authored expression to garner
copyright protections.238
Charles Cronin, in a 2009 article concerning VARA and
conceptual artworks made with living materials, asserts that in
order to classify these conceptual works as art, “extrinsic
circumstances [are relied upon] to a much greater extent
than . . . works in traditional genres.”239 He argues that the
nature of conceptual works requires a contextual approach: the
works cannot be interpreted without these extrinsic
circumstances. A Monet would easily be recognized, even if
“stripped of its sumptuous frame[,]” but Jeff Koons’s balloon
figures or Duchamp’s urinal would be seen as having little or
no aesthetic appeal if they were encountered outside of their
“frame” or “art” context.240 For Cronin, the reliance on extrinsic
circumstances and context means this avant-garde art garners
less protection from VARA. Cronin’s argument is limited,
however, because these more conceptual works are
intentionally moving away from the traditional confines of
gallery walls and museum spaces.241 In fact, “[c]ertain current
art practice is about breaking down the doors of art’s exalted
cloister and exploding the definition of art, especially
definitions that envision a narrow ‘high’ art.”242 This artistic
practice should be protected even if it presents a challenge to
the current copyright scheme.
Cronin also argues that conceptual works garner less
copyright protection because they are primarily concepts or ideas.
It is universally understood that ideas are not copyrightable, yet
this overlooks the material components of these works. Artists
over the last century have been stretching the form of artworks
but have not ceased creative expression through their chosen
medium. Conceptual and contemporary artists have utilized
customarily functional materials to access artistic expression that
the more removed and rarified “traditional” art materials
sometimes cannot. Conceptual artists present finished works that
See infra notes 254-53 and the accompanying text.
Cronin, supra note 225, at 236.
240 Id. at 235-36. What Cronin considers a demerit toward the classification of
the artwork Arthur Danto argues is a baseline required for the interpretation of art
objects. Danto and other “institutionalists” would not distinguish between Monet and
Duchamp; for them, all art objects require the context of the “art world” in order to be
seen as art. See generally Danto, supra note 231; see also Farley, supra note 19, at 844.
241 For a discussion of intentional changes in and departures from the artworld ethos, see supra Part I.A.
242 Farley, supra note 19, at 814.
238
239
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are products of creative expression, but Cronin argues that artists
should not be allowed to “elevate[] the status of these [non-art]
materials to that of art by addressing them as such . . . .”243 Cronin
asserts that works employing materials that have not been in use
“[s]ince time immemorial” do not rise to the level of art just
because an artist has done something creative with them.244
However, this assertion is simply untenable. Nowhere in the
copyright-protection statutes exists such a requirement that art
materials satisfy some preapproved list of acceptable and
traditional materials. Cronin offers two pointed criticisms of
avant-garde art, both of which focus on contextual and material
components, but he leaves out artistic intention and how the art
world receives the work. These conceptual works should not fail to
garner protection simply because they are focused on the idea,
and not the materials employed in their execution.
B.

Moral Rights, Foreign and Domestic

International copyright protections were established in
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (Berne Convention). This doctrine is particularly focused
on the “[r]ights of [a]ttribution and [i]ntegrity.”245 Berne
Convention rights “are commonly called ‘moral rights’ because
they ‘are a constellation of rights that ensure an ongoing
relationship between the author and the creative work outside
[of] economic issues.’”246 For instance, the right of integrity
“allow[s] an artist to prevent changes to her work that would
affect her honor or reputation negatively.”247 This right, granted
to artists, serves to protect their finished work product from
Cronin, supra note 225, at 252.
Id. at 243.
245 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006); 7 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§ 23:16 (2011); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.
6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 1160 U.N.T.S. 30. The United
States adheres to the Berne Convention with certain important exceptions, namely
that the U.S. Berne Implementation Act of 1988 insists that “the Copyright Act, the
Lanham Act, and state law” are the “sole source of rights” for copyright protection in
the United States, rejecting the additional “moral rights” under Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention. 7 PATRY, supra, § 23:23. “The obligations of the United States under
the Berne Convention may be performed only pursuant to appropriate domestic law.”
Id. § 23:45 (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-568, 100th Cong., 26 Sess. § 2(2), 102 Stat. 2853).
This is not to say that certain moral rights have not been extended in the Copyright
Act to works of visual art over time (e.g., VARA), but rather that the United States’s
recognition of artists’ moral rights came well after the international community’s. Id.
§ 23:23.
246 Davis, supra note 57, at 219-20 (quoting Justin Hughes, American Moral
Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 660 (2007)).
247 Id. at 220 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 6).
243
244
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being changed into something else (e.g., a collection of non-art
components). Though a layperson might try to destroy an
artist’s work by denigrating or taxing it, this kind of clumsy
effort might indeed enhance the prestige of the artist. Still, the
honor of artists as artists lives through their works; the act of
denying that their work is art may play well in the press, but it
indeed negatively affects their honor.
European copyright laws appear “better adapted to
address the interests of fine artists because they protect not
only the finished work, but also the artist’s control over the
creative process and ultimately her persona and reputation.”248
It is ironic, then, that EU copyright better respects the persona
and reputation of the artist while the EU VAT system, which
recognizes both the existence and cultural importance of fine
artwork, does not. These two systems should ideally be working
in concert; interpretations under one (i.e., TARIC) should
respect and heed the protections of the other (i.e., the Berne
Convention). In passing the 2010 regulation, the Commission
seems to be doing anything but that. Considering the
increasing use of “atypical” materials in contemporary
artworks, the implications of the 2010 regulation become all
the more alarming. The next time a customs official in the U.K.
is confronted with a box of bricks or cords of wood imported by
a gallery or museum and listed as an artwork, it is very likely
that they will be subject to the import VAT appropriate for
their raw industrial components.249 The problem of appropriate
taxation will continue to arise as the frequency of inclusion of
non-art materials continues to increase in paintings,
sculptures, and other types of artworks.
In the United States, VARA extended certain copyright
protections to “author[s] of work[s] of visual art.”250 Some of the
rights granted through VARA were “[r]ights of attribution and
integrity.”251 These rights match the Berne Convention system,
but standard U.S. copyright requirements must first be met
before the VARA rights are even reached.252 The basic tenets of
copyright protection under the Copyright Act require that a
work be an original, authored expression in a fixed and
Sapolich, supra note 47, at 455.
For a discussion of the increasingly common use of nontraditional
materials in artworks, see supra notes 58-69.
250 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006).
251 Id.
252 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132
S. Ct. 380 (2011). The court in Kelley called these basic copyright requirements
“foundational.” Id.
248
249
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tangible form.253 In U.S. copyright law, “the ‘requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will
suffice.’”254 Courts find “creativity is not a high bar to
copyright[, and] . . . a ‘work of art’ exists when ‘by the most
generous standard [it] may arguably be said to evince
creativity.’”255 This implies that moral rights of conceptual
artists could be given all the more protection: if only a modicum
of creativity is required, many alleged artworks will be
accepted as such, and many alleged artists will have their
moral rights protected.
Though Flavin’s and Viola’s sculptures are only
“minimally differentiated from [their] non-art materials,”256
these artists have contributed more than a little creativity in
detailing how to construct the installations. So long as this
minimal level is met, it would seem U.S. copyright protection
could be asserted. How is it, then, that the U.S. copyright
provisions can be seen as more assertive of an artist’s moral
rights than the European system and its droit morale
protections? This demonstrates that something is amiss in the
2010 regulation.
A copyright can be obtained with a “low standard of
originality.”257 This “is intended to minimize the possibility that
judges would interject their own ideas of what is and is not
art.”258 Setting the creativity bar low keeps judges from having to
make subjective determinations, thus “ensur[ing] that judges
remain objective and neutral.”259 Unpopular or controversial art
movements could be at risk if judges needed to make subjective
determinations as to whether a work warrants copyright
protection. Certain trends in “artistic development might be
stultified by ignorant or outdated legal evaluations.”260 “Judges
[could not] make artistic decisions while remaining objective,”
since the heart of artistic decisions is individual taste, an
inherently subjective concept.261 The U.S. copyright system
properly considers a work worthy of protection even if it only
17 U.S.C. § 102.
Sapolich, supra note 47, at 461 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).
255 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08(B)(1) (Matthew Bender & Co. 2006)).
256 Id. at 460.
257 Id. at 472.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Farley, supra note 19, at 814.
261 Sapolich, supra note 47, at 473 (quoting Farley, supra note 19, at 812-13).
253
254

1698

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:4

evinces creativity. That the Commission, operating within a
system granting greater protections for artists’ moral rights,
does not acknowledge this creativity as a contributing factor for
being considered “art” further demonstrates the mysteriousness
of the Commission’s standard.
C.

VARA’s “Recognized Stature” Protection

Section 106A(a)(3) of VARA has particular relevance for
Flavin and Viola. This section provides authors of works of
visual art the rights:
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion . . . or . . . modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and
any intentional distortion . . . or modification of that work is a violation
of that right, and (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that
work is a violation of that right.262

Destruction is defined as “the state or fact of being
destroyed” or “the action or process of destroying something.”263
Destroy means “to put out of existence” or “neutralize.”264
Admittedly these definitions are narrow in that they bring to
mind tangible, visceral destruction. In the context of more
conceptual and experiential work, what is destruction?265
Perhaps it is simply seeing only the components and not the
whole. When a party—not the artist—acts to remove or collapse
or disassemble an artwork, provided it fulfills the other
requirements under VARA, that party can become liable for
destruction under the statute. When the discussion centers on
minimal or conceptual works of art, the question of destruction
is often tricky. Damien Hirst’s “trash installation” following an
opening-night party is a near-perfect example.266 The morning
after the opening, the gallery cleaning crew threw away bags
containing spent wine cups and cigarette butts, thinking them
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2006).
Destruction Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/destruction (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
264 Destroy Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/destroy (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
265 VARA briefly discusses what destruction or modification is not, holding
conservation and relocation efforts acceptable “modifications” of an artwork that do not
actually destroy it. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1)-(2). For conceptual artworks, this does not go
far enough. In dismissing something as small as an idea, a conceptual work may in fact
be destroyed.
266 Daniel Rozenberg (“Dadara”), Trash Worth $100 Million, ART AS MONEY
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://blog.artasmoney.com/art-as-money/trash-worth-100-million/.
262
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nothing more than garbage.267 But, Hirst had arranged the
“trash” after the party, considering it a part of the installation.268
Although Hirst found it humorous, in terms of VARA protection
it is possible that the cleaning crew, or even the gallery, would
have been liable for the installation’s “destruction.”269
In the context of artwork preservation, these definitions
also chafe against the realities of some contemporary works of
art. Certain works “must be disassembled in order to preserve
their value and ensure their continued existence.”270 Certainly
Flavin’s and Viola’s installations must be “destroyed” (i.e.,
disassembled) in order to move them from museum to gallery
or vice versa. In fact, “disassembly is [often] required to
conserve the work consistently with the artist’s vision.”271
Nathan Davis’s article challenged a Southern District Judge’s
decision for hewing too closely to the dictionary definitions of
“remove” or “destroy” in the context of artwork preservation.272
Davis asserts, “There is a difference between dismantling the
sculpture never to recompose it, and dismantling a sculpture
intending to put it back together once a part of it has been
fixed.”273 This distinction applies directly to the Flavin and
Viola installations. Both the Flavin and Viola works were
dismantled with the intention that the London gallery which
was importing them would put them back together. When the
works arrived at U.K. customs, this should have been obvious.
Had the European Commission understood this distinction, it
is possible that the classification of these installations as
“sculpture,” by the U.K. Tribunal would have gone
undisturbed. Sadly, the Commission did recognize that the
Flavin and Viola components were intended to be reassembled,
but they nevertheless denied these installations “sculpture”
status.274 Instead, the Commission required the act of switching
the lights and projectors on in order to achieve a finished
artwork.275 As discussed in Part III, this standard is impossibly
Id.
Id.
269 Id.
270 Davis, supra note 57, at 241.
271 Id. (discussing a Robert Morris minimalist sculpture entitled Rope Piece
consisting of a piece of “rope draped between two painted wooden elements”). Id. at 240.
272 Id. at 241 (discussing Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of
New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226, 2005 WL 1153752 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2005)). That decision
seems predicated on the idea that the work is destroyed once disassembled, thereby being
unable to “return to existence.” Id.
273 Id.
274 See supra Part III.A.
275 See supra Part III.A.
267
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high, and the distinction the Commission forces on these works
is not really one of assembled versus disassembled, but one of
on versus off. Conservationists of any other type of artwork
would hardly make such a distinction as “whether the
electricity is flowing.”
The “moral rights” secured through VARA “protect[] the
right of an artist to preserve a work of art even after that work
is sold.”276 It is VARA’s requirement of “recognized stature” that
gives an artist’s moral-rights claim any legitimacy277: “where a
particular work of art has achieved recognized stature, VARA
gives the artist the right to prevent its destruction.”278 The twopart test for prevailing on these VARA-violation claims
requires the plaintiff to prove (i) that the piece is a “work of
recognized stature,” and (ii) that the “[d]efendants destroyed the
piece in an intentional or grossly negligent manner.”279
Recognized stature “is generally established through expert
testimony” that proves that the “artistic merit” of the piece has
“been recognized by . . . the artistic community and/or the
general public.”280 For VARA protection, the artist’s particular
piece at issue must “have achieved such stature[,]” though there
are circumstances imaginable in which an artist “is of such
recognized stature that any work by that artist would be subject
to VARA’s protection.”281 Nathan Davis reads the statute and
concludes it is “[a]n imperfect solution to the problem”282 because
it leaves out too many conceptual artists, honoring only the “Old
Masters.”283 Though not perfect, accepting recognized stature of
the artist as proof that the artist’s finished products are “art” is
certainly more defensible than the Commission’s treatment of
Flavin and Viola.

276 Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Pollara v.
Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003)).
277 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2006); see also Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
278 Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (citing Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F.
Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and vacated on other grounds,
71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995)).
279 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B); Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325); see also
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing Carter’s test
interpreting VARA).
280 Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (internal quotation marks omitted).
281 Id. In the instance of the Hirst party trash being thrown away, Hirst’s
recognized stature would likely impute onto any work he claims to have authored.
282 Davis, supra note 57, at 221.
283 Id. at 228.
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“Self-Expression” and Arbiters of Taste

Besides recognized stature, U.S. courts have required
self-expression when granting protections to an artwork under
the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that “[a]ny artist’s original [artwork] holds potential to ‘affect
public attitudes,’ by spurring thoughtful reflection in and
discussion among its viewers. So long as it is an artist’s selfexpression, [an artwork] will be protected under the First
Amendment, because it expresses the artist’s perspective.”284
This “self-expression” need not be singular or narrow. The
Supreme Court has said that “a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection . . . .”285
Requiring such a message, the Court reasoned, would invalidate
entire wings of major museums that show artists like Jackson
Pollock.286 Rather, self-expression can be broadly construed. The
Court has also “distinguished between restrictions on expression
based on subject matter and restrictions based on viewpoint,
indicating that the latter are particularly pernicious.”287 A
“bedrock principle” of First Amendment jurisprudence “is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”288
When legislation’s “suppression of speech . . . attempt[s] to give
one side of a debatable public question an advantage[,] . . . the
First Amendment is plainly offended.”289
The Second Circuit takes a similar view of legislation that
“looks upon visual art as mere ‘merchandise’ lacking in
communicative concepts or ideas.”290 In Bery v. City of New York,
the court addressed an appeal concerning regulations the City of
New York had adopted prohibiting sales of art in public places
without a general vendor’s license.291 The court found the
approach of the city “myopic[,] . . . [and] fundamentally
284 White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted)
(quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)) (discussing the right
of an itinerant painter to be granted the necessary permits to sell his work in a
restricted park).
285 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995) (discussing constitutional protections due to a gay and lesbian group
seeking to march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade).
286 Id.
287 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment).
288 Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
289 Id. at 430-31 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
785-86 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
290 Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996).
291 Id. at 691.
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misperceiv[ing] the essence of visual communication and artistic
expression.”292 “Visual art[,]” the court held, “is as wide ranging in
its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book . . . or
other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment
protection.”293
Not so surprisingly, these courts have not required the
aesthetic opinions of the judges themselves. Judges have been
hesitant to take steps that would “destroy” an artwork (though
they are also practicing some self-protection). The majority in
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, a Seventh Circuit case, began,
“We are not art critics, do not pretend to be and do not need to
be to decide this case.”294 The concurrence expressed a similar
sentiment: “Like my colleagues, I am not an art critic. So I
begin with the well-worn adage that one man’s junk is another
man’s treasure. No doubt [the artist] treasured what the city’s
bulldozers treated as junk.”295
These judges, and many others, rely on Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s famous statement on the intersection of
aesthetics and judicial restraint.296 In Bleistein v. Donaldson, one
of Holmes’s first Supreme Court opinions, he said that “[it]
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
[artworks] . . . . [S]ome works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation.”297 Holmes’s opinion understood that many art
movements are “repulsive until the public [learns] the new
language in which [the artist] spoke.”298 Judges fear exposing
themselves as “culturally elite” by revealing their aesthetic

Id. at 695.
Id. Ten years later, in Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, the Second
Circuit declined to extend the “Bery injunction” to plaintiffs who were selling articles of
clothing painted with graffiti. 435 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2006). The court reasoned that
articles of clothing painted with graffiti were not necessarily expressive, and that the
Bery injunction should be narrowly read not to include “clothing painted with graffiti”
under the category of “paintings.” Id. Additionally, objects that are utilitarian in nature
or are promotional/advertising materials do not fall within the protections of VARA. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 327, 329 (5th Cir.
2010).
294 Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999). In
Martin, the court discussed the city’s argument that the artist had waived this VARA
protection through their contract. Id. at 614. Ultimately, the court was not persuaded
by the city’s argument. Id.
295 Id. at 615 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
296 Farley, supra note 19, at 815.
297 Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251
(1903)).
298 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
292
293
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opinions in court—and no judge wants their opinion to be
vulnerable to later attack.299
In Martin there was a contract between the artist and the
city, which had included the possibility of future removal of his
sculpture from its original site.300 In fact, the sculpture was
created with this specific possibility in mind, “engineered . . . so
that it could be disassembled for removal and later
reassembled.”301 Nowhere in the Martin opinion did the court
indicate that the artwork, or the VARA protections afforded to it,
suddenly ceased to exist upon any potential disassembly for
relocation. Once afforded the recognized stature, the VARA
protections for Martin’s sculpture could not be easily undone;
taking the piece apart for relocation would not have
compromised those protections; neither would have, for
example, moving the piece on a flatbed travelling down the
highway. The legal protections would not disappear simply
because the artwork was disassembled for removal. Clearly
they would not cease to exist during shipment, either. Such an
implication would be—to recall the language of the U.K. VAT
Tribunal—absurd. It would mean that an artwork’s VARA
protections could be circumvented if the artwork was first
disassembled. Somehow the components could be destroyed
without violating VARA but the assembled work could not.
Such machinations would be the equivalent of removing a
work’s copyright protections simply by disassembling it. The
courts’ VARA interpretations provide that an artist’s legal
protections extend to the disassembled components of an
artwork because the artwork retains its status as an artwork
even when disassembled. The European Commission’s
declaration that Flavin’s and Viola’s works in disassembled
form (and even once re-assembled) are void of artistic content is
in direct contradiction to this learned jurisprudence.
While both the U.S. and EU legal systems accommodate
the artist’s moral rights—either through droit morale, VARA
and copyright protections, or the First Amendment concept of
self-expression—what underpins them all is an acceptance that
once a work is recognized by the art community as art,
copyright and other protections should be afforded to it.
Conceptual works of art may find trouble in language and
definition, but having satisfied the baseline original and
299
300
301

Farley, supra note 19, at 814-15.
Martin, 192 F.3d at 611.
Id.
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creative expression requirements under the U.S. copyright
system, these works should at a minimum not be denied
protections under the law. The question of what qualifies as
destruction under VARA, while important to investigations of
liability under the Act, is secondary to the first requirement
under VARA—the recognized stature provision. It is this
standard that courts, both domestic and foreign, are primed to
apply, and many have already proven their ability to do so.
Legislators can easily get behind this standard because it
removes any subjectivity they might need (or want) to employ
in their lawmaking. Lawmakers should decline to act as
arbiters of taste, just as many learned judges have done, and
leave instead the expert determinations of an artwork’s status
to the art experts.
CONCLUSION
While some of the pitfalls of VARA have been discussed
above,302 the standards set out in the legislation—the
requirements of “recognized stature” in particular—would
make courts’ evaluations of the merits of an object, installation,
or experience as an artwork more reliable. This same structure
could also be applied to the imposition of import taxes and
duties, particularly in jurisdictions that provide for lower tax
rates on artwork. The means for applying taxes on the basis of
an object’s status as “artwork” would be well served by the
requirements imposed under this recognized-stature condition.
While the United States does not currently impose a tax
system similar to the harmonized system of the European
Community, leading economists have proposed a “consumption
tax” as an answer to the nation’s economic woes.303 Though the
idea “offends many conservatives”304 for its enabling of an
expanded spending power of the government and an increase in
government overall,305 liberals find it equally unfavorable for
imposing taxes on citizens’ consumption. It is possible that the
VAT “appeal to liberals can be enhanced . . . by exempting items

See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
Robert J. Barro, Op-Ed, How to Really Save the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2011, at SR8 [hereinafter Barro, Save the Economy], available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/09/11/opinion/sunday/how-to-really-save-the-economy.html.
304 Id.
305 Robert J. Barro, Opinion, How to Get That AAA Rating Back, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/files/11_0808_AAA_
WSJ.pdf [hereinafter Barro, AAA Rating]; Barro, Save the Economy, supra note 303.
302
303
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such as food and housing.”306 Economists claim that implementing
this type of tax on consumer spending could raise “revenue
[of] . . . roughly five percent of G.D.P.”307 In fact, some
economists see a VAT as “more efficient than an income tax.”308
But, regardless of one’s opinion, implementing such a system
would leave the nation vulnerable to a host of classification
questions. Of course, the classification of artworks for taxation
purposes is not the main concern of a government seeking to
dig itself out of a sluggish economy, but allowing further
sacrifice of the value of our cultural works would have its own
deleterious effects on the nation.
For Flavin’s and Viola’s works, the matter is not yet
closed, even though the European Commission went “to such
elaborate lengths to overturn the decision of [the Tribunal] in
relation to a relatively small amount of import tax in relation
to artworks[.]”309 There is hope: David Zwirner gallery, which
brought a seldom-seen Flavin series to the International
Contemporary Art Fair (FIAC)310 in October 2011, and which
represents the Flavin estate, has recently retained the law firm
of Mayer Brown to “explore the gallery’s legal options
regarding the . . . ruling.”311
Rachel J. Tischler†

Barro, AAA Rating, supra note 305.
Barro, Save the Economy, supra note 303.
308 Id.
309 Henry Lydiate, VAT: Flavin’s Fittings, ARTQUEST, http://www.artquest.org.uk/
articles/view/flavin-s-fittings (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
310 FIAC is the International Contemporary Art Fair. Begun in 1974, it
returned to Paris in 2005 and exhibits modern and contemporary artists represented
by galleries throughout the world. FAQ’s, FIAC!, http://www.fiac.com/faq.html?lg=en
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